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FIDUCIARY PROTECTION OF NONOPERATING
OIL AND GAS INTERESTS AGAINST THE
ACTS OF AN OPERATOR
I. INTRODUCTION
In the routine transactions associated with energy exploration and
development, the interests in the mineral property frequently become
divided between many persons and into many forms. While divided
ownership of any real property is fraught with potential disputes as to
the precise rights of each party, the rights of holders of nonoperating oil
and gas interests are particularly vulnerable because they arise from the
leasehold rather than from the underlying mineral estate. Most instru-
ments creating nonoperating interests contain no provisions defining
the oil and gas operator's obligations to the holder of the nonoperating
interest. Thus, courts are left with the difficult task of determining the
scope of protection to afford nonoperators against the acts of an opera-
tor that extinguish the nonoperating interest. The purpose of this Com-
ment is to assist persons interested in the development of oil and gas
law to assess the relationship between operators and nonoperators, to
consider the importance of protective clauses within the creating instru-
ment, and to explore factors that are important in determining the ex-
tent of protection nonoperators should be allowed.
II. NATURE OF NONOPERATING INTERESTS
Nonoperating interests are interests in minerals in which the own-
er of the interest has no right to engage in operations to remove the
minerals.' The most common types of nonoperating interests2 created
are the overriding royalty,3 the production payment,4 the carried inter-
est,5 and the net profits interest.6
1. 5 E. KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 63.1, at 197 (1978).
2. Id
3. An overriding royalty is an interest "severed" out of the working interest or lessee's share
of the oil, free of the expenses of development, operation, and production. See Id § 63.2, at 197-
98.
4. The production payment is an interest created or carved out of any greater interest in the
minerals. The interest entitles its owner to a specific share of oil and/or gas, or to a payment
determined by a specific share of production, free of costs. Id § 63.3, at 213.
5. The carried interest is a fractional interest in oil and gas property. "the party owning the
remaining fraction of the working interest, the carrying party, pays the entire cost of drilling and
1
Schoole: Fiduciary Protection of Nonoperating Oil and Gas Interests agains
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
NONOPERATING OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
Nonoperators may realistically be concerned that an operator wil
allow a lease to expire, thus terminating the nonoperating interest. Or-
dinarily, the nonoperator has no remedy in this situation since a non-
operating interest is carved out of the working interest of a lease and
depends for its existence upon the continuation of the lease. The non-
operating interest will be extinguished on the termination of the lease.7
This is true whether the lease expires by its own terms,' by the failure
of the operator to comply with a drilling clause, 9 or by the operator's
surrender of the lease."0 One court stated the general rule that a non-
operating interest may be lost entirely by "cancellation, surrender,
abandonment resulting from diminution of production beyond eco-
nomic feasibility, [or] total failure to secure production in paying quan-
tities.""I In Oklahoma, even where oil and gas are discovered during
the primary term of the lease, if the acquisition of a market does not
take place until after the expiration of the primary term, a nonpartici-
pating term interest will terminate with the primary term.12
Although the nonoperating interest easily may be lost, an operator
ordinarily has no duty to a nonoperator to keep a lease alive.13 The
mere existence of a nonoperating interest will not impose an implied
obligation on the operator to preserve,14 develop, 15 or give notice
operation, including costs attributable to the carried party's interest. Thereafter, the carrying
party is entitled to all the benefits of production from the entire working interest until all his costs,
including those attributable to the carried interest, have been recovered. The carrying party may
also be entitled to recover a penalty in addition to recouping actual costs to take into account risk
or interest factors. See id § 63.4, at 224-25.
6. The net profits interest is a specified share of the net profits from production, without
personal liability for costs or losses. See id § 63.5, at 228.
7. 3 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 554, at 634 (1958); see also Standard Oil
Co. v. Marshall, 265 F.2d 46, 53 (5th Cir. 1959) (oil payment expires with termination of lease),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); Fain & McGaha v. Biesel, 331 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960) (override extinguished on surrender of leasehold).
8. See Davis v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70, 74 (10th Cir. 1964).
9. See Phillips v. Bruce, 41 Cal. App. 2d 404, -, 106 P.2d 922, 924 (1940).
10. Keese v. Continental Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1956).
11. DeMik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229, 233 (Okla. 1971).
12. McEvoy v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 624 P.2d 559, 559-62 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
The court distinguished non-participating interest cases from oil and gas lease cases. In lease
cases, a lessee has by implication a reasonable time to obtain a market even after the primary term
has expired. The court explained that a grantor or reserver of terminable nonoperating interests
does not contemplate operations by the lessee for the mutual benefit of the parties. Id
13. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 420.1, at 353 (1981); see Davis v.
Cities Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70, 74-75 (10th Cir. 1964).
14. See Davis v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70, 74-75 (10th Cir. 1964); Keese v. Continen-
tal Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1956); see also Collins v. Atlantic Oil Prod. Co., 74
F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1934) (covenant to keep the lease alive by payment of rentals is not to be
implied in assignment of lease because it would add a burden to assignment on the operator that
was perhaps not intended). But cf. Howell v. Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, -, 271
1983]
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before releasing a lease.1 6 The duty to develop or give notice arises by
express contractual provision. A duty to preserve a lease may arise
from a statute or a fiduciary relationship between the parties 7 as well
as by express contractual agreement. 18 Furthermore, the mere assign-
ment of a lease reserving a nonoperating interest does not establish
such a fiduciary relationship. It must be created by the express terms of
the assignment. 19
Also, a special situation may be present when an operator volunta-
rily surrenders a lease. It has been suggested that where an operator
voluntarily surrenders a lease to the landowner, there is some doubt as
to the extinguishment of nonoperating interests without joinder of the
nonoperator.20  However, the weight of authority upholds the opera-
tor's right to voluntarily surrender the lease during its primary term,
thereby extinguishing the carved-out interest.2'
A nonoperator may have some degree of inherent protection
against an operator's relinquishing the lease because of the parties'
community of interests. The operator has the more valuable interest to
protect and will presumably give it up only when it appears to be non-
profitable.22 In some instances, however, "inherent protection" may be
inadequate to secure his interest. A nonoperator may therefore insert
clauses in the transfer agreement requiring the operator to preserve the
lease, to develop the mineral interest, and to give notice of an intent to
terminate the lease with a right to demand reassignment. 3 When these
P.2d 271, 275 (1954) (implied obligation to keep lease alive where there is confidential relation-
ship); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 359 ("there may be a duty to use good
faith in determining whether to let a lease expire").
15. Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 804-05 (Tex. 1967). But e. Howell v.
Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, -, 271 P.2d 271, 275 (1954) (implied obligation to
develop where there is confidential relationship).
16. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McCormick, 211 F.2d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 1954).
17. Davis v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70, 74-75 (10th Cir. 1964).
18. See Guinand v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 485 F.2d 414,417 (10th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70, 74-75 (10th Cir. 1964).
19. Davis v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 338 F.2d 70, 75 (10th Cir. 1964).
20. Discussion Notes, 6 OIL & GAS REP. 368, 369 (1956).
21. McClintock, Legal Relations Between Lessees and Owners of Interests Carved Out of
Leases, 7 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139, 149-50 (1962); see Chase v. Trimble, 69 Cal. App. 2d
44, -, 158 P.2d 247, 249-50 (1947); Fain & McGaha v. Biesel, 331 S.W.2d 346, 348 (rex. Civ.
App. 1960); W. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 641 (Operators may even obtain a quitclaim, joinder, or
other release so there will be no uncertainty as to the termination.); cf. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEY-
ERs, supra note 13, § 418.2, at 347 n.2 (probably not serious risk not to obtain such releases).
22. Warren, Transfer of the Oiland Gas Lessee's Interest, 34 TEx. L. REy. 386, 413-14 (1956).
23. Extension and renewal provisions are ineffective where the operator does not take a sec-
ond lease because there is no renewal lease to which the interest may attach. Id at 414. As will be
seen, however, such clauses may provide substantial protection when the operator does take a
second lease. See infra text accompanying notes 72-80 & 97-99.
[Vol. 18:496
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covenants are included in the assignment, the operator will be liable for
failure to perform the covenant. Although the nonoperating interest
will still be extinguished on termination of the lease, the nonoperator
will be entitled to damages, if proved, for the breach of the covenant.24
Although a nonoperator cannot claim fiduciary protection of his
interest in the event of a termination of the lease, a "vaguely defined
duty of fair dealing owed by the operator" to the nonoperator appears
to be developing. 5 Encompassed within this duty may be an obligation
to use good faith in determining whether to allow a lease to expire.
The remedy for a failure to use good faith in this regard is the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust upon any benefits realized as a result of this
failure.26 One court suggests that where an operator has voluntarily
undertaken to pay delay rentals, an action may arise for failure to make
timely payments. There may be some evidence of bad faith when an
operator surrenders a producing lease.28 However, it is difficult to es-
tablish that the operator surrendering the lease has acted in bad faith if
he does not subsequently take a new lease on the premises.29 When an
operator does take a new lease on the premises and "washes out" the
nonoperating interest, courts may more readily perceive that the opera-
24. See Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (damages
for failure to reassign are market value of leasehold estate lost). McClintock believes this measure
of damages is reasonable despite the fact that most nonoperators probably feel they should be
entitled to the full measure of production had the lease not been lost. McClintock, supra note 21,
at 157-58. But cf Walton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 501 P.2d 802, 805 (Wyo. 1972) (no damages
for failure to give notice when due to error, but damages for fair market value of overriding
royalty interest). Some companies now limit damages to a specific amount, such as the sum paid
for the assignment. McClintock, supra note 21, at 158. On the basis of such a clause, an operator
was held liable for failing to give notice, with damages to be measured by the market value of the
leases on the date of the breach. Connell v. Sun Oil Co., 42 Colo. App. 311, -, 596 P.2d 1215,
1218 (1979). The court explained that unlike a liquidated damages provision, the agreement limit-
ing damages did "not create an unconditional promise by defendant to pay a definite sum in the
event of a breach, neither [did] it set the minimum amount which plaintiffs shall recover if defend-
ant breaches." Id at -, 596 P.2d at 1217. See generally H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, SUpra note
13, §§ 428430, at 468-94 (direct effect of protective clauses in assignment); Eaton, The Reassign-
ment Provsion--Meaningful or Not?, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 601 (1975) (direct effect of
reassignment provision).
25. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 359.
26. Id at 359-60.
27. Gilroy v. White Eagle Oil Co., 201 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1952) (dictum).
28. See Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). An attempted termi-
nation of producing lease was ineffective. There were additional factors, however, that evidenced
bad faith on the part of the operator. Cf. Wier v. Glassell, 216 La. 828, -, 44 So. 2d 882, 889
(1950) (dictum that there may be some evidence of fraud if production has been obtained when
top lease is taken and base lease is then allowed to expire).
29. See La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. 2d 132, -, 114 P.2d 351, 356 (1941); cf.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McCormick, 211 F.2d 361, 363-64 (10th Cir. 1954) (no bad faith where
operator did not later acquire or claim any interest in new lease).
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tor acted in bad faith.30
III. WASH-OUTS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROTECTIVE CLAUSES
A so-called "wash-out" transaction is "conduct of the operator
designed to extinguish the nonoperating interest while preserving the
operator's interest in the premises."'3 1 This may be done in two ways:
the operator may take a top lease before the end of the primary term of
the lease and then allow the lease to terminate, 32 or he may terminate
the existing lease and afterwards obtain a new lease.33
Unlike the situation in which the operator merely terminates the
lease, the nonoperator has no inherent protection against wash-out
transactions. An operator may further his own interest at the expense
of the nonoperator by "shaking off" the nonoperating interest and ob-
taining a new lease unburdened by that interest. This situation, which
generally involves some bad faith on the part of the operator, seems to
call for added protection from the courts. Otherwise, the nonoperator
is completely at the mercy of the operator. Accordingly, some courts
respond with substantial protection for the nonoperator. 4
However, the argument may also be made that a nonoperator does
not need increased court protection since he may easily protect himself
by inserting provisions in the transfer agreement requiring reassign-
ment; notice of intent to surrender; or an interest in renewals, modifica-
tions, and extensions of the lease.35 One commentator has stated, "If
the transferor has neglected to protect himself by taking elementary
precautions in the transfer agreement, his plight evokes little sympa-
thy."36 This is especially true when the nonoperator is an experienced
30. See Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Wier v. Glassell, 216 La.
828, 44 So. 2d 882 (1950).
31. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 354.
32. See, eg., Goocey v. Hopkins, 206 Ky. 176, 266 S.W. 1087 (Ky. Ct. App. 1924); Thomas v.
Whyte, 5 Mich. App. 281, 146 N.W.2d 721 (1966); Probst v. Hughes, 143 Okla. 11, 286 P. 875
(1930).
33. See, e.g., Independent Gas & Oil Producers, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 669 F.2d 624 (10th
Cir. 1982); Howell v. Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954).
34. E.g., Independent Gas & Oil Producers, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 669 F.2d 624 (10th Cir.
1982); Howell v. Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954); Rees v. Briscoe,
315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957).
35. E.g., Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Kennedy, 251 F.2d 424, 432 (9th Cir. 1957) ("If they had
desired to establish an express trust, there would have been no difficulty for an expert draftsman to
have chosen apt language to create such a relationship."); see also K & E Drilling, Inc. v. Warren,
185 Kan. 29, -, 340 P.2d 919, 923 (1959) (parties may protect themselves with appropriate
language).
36. Warren, supra note 22, at 417.
[Vol. 18:496
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investor in the oil and gas industry.37 A look at the cases reveals how
courts have struggled with the problem of whether operators should be
allowed protection when they have neglected to include protective pro-
visions in their transfer agreements. To find a basis for such protec-
tions, courts look to the specific language in the assignment, a fiduciary
relationship between the parties as shown by the particular facts of the
case, or a duty of fair dealing.
Traditionally, courts have been hesitant to protect the nonoperator
in a situation in which an assignment has been made without renewal
or similar protective provisions.38  The opinions generally state that
apart from the terms of his contract, a nonoperator has no protection. 9
The relationship between the operator and nonoperator does not auto-
matically rise to the level of a fiduciary relationship so as to require
protection for the nonoperator.4° Courts have not found a duty on the
part of the operators which prevents them from acquiring a top lease
before allowing an existing lease to expire.4' The general rule has been
stated:
In ordinary circumstances, the mere reserving of an overrid-
ing royalty interest in the assignment of an oil and gas lease-
alone and without more--does not create a confidential or
37. Id; see H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 359 ("[unformed parties,
dealing at arm's length, may be expected to include the provision if such be their intent.").
38. See Keese v. Continental Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1956); Gordon v. Empire
Gas & Fuel Co., 63 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 751 (1933); Goocey v. Hopkins,
206 Ky. 176, 266 S.W. 1087 (Ky. Ct. App. 1924).
39. E.g., Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Kennedy, 251 F.2d 424, 432 (9th Cir. 1957); K & E Drilling,
Inc. v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29, -, 340 P.2d 919, 923 (1959); Fain & McGaha v. Biesel, 331 S.W.2d
346, 348 (Trex. Civ. App. 1960).
40. See Bardill, Inc. v. Bird, 346 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961). Bardill is typical in its
characterization of the relationship between the operator and the nonoperator. The court said
that the mere assignment of an oil and gas lease creates no fiduciary relation. That relationship
must be created by the assignment agreement, not by operation of law. In the absence of contrac-
tual provisions, neither party has a duty "to keep the lease alive for the benefit of the other or to
recognize the beneficial interest of the other in a new lease with the owner," id at 26 (emphasis
added). The court explains by saying that the rights of the operator and the nonoperator in the
leasehold are for most purposes separable. Although certain actions inure to the benefit of both,
"there is no duty by implication of law upon either to take affirmative action for the benefit of the
other." Id (citing Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960)).
41. Wier v. Glassell, 216 La. 828, 44 So. 2d 882 (1950); Thomas v. Whyte, 5 Mich. App. 281,
146 N.W.2d 721 (1966); see Goocey v. Hopkins, 206 Ky. 176, 266 S.W. 1087 (Ky. Ct. App. 1924)
(nonoperator has no cause of action when an operator acquires a new lease prior to the termina-
tion of the base lease); cf. Henry v. Gulf Ref. Co., 179 Ark. 138, 15 S.W.2d 979 (1929) (assignee
not entitled to any interest in top lease obtained by lessee); Hawkins v. Klein, 124 Okla. 161, 255
P. 570 (1927) (sublessee may take top lease and sublessor's override will terminate on expiration of
primary lease), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 588 (1928). But cf. Akin v. Marshall Oil Co., 188 Pa. 602, 41
A. 748 (1898) (top lease will not be effective as against override retained on sublease where top
lease taken while base lease still in effect).
6
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fiduciary relationship between the assignor and the assignee
which denies to the assignee the right to obtain from the own-
er of the land a top lease to take effect after the expiration of
the assigned lease free of the burden of the overriding royalty,
either in the form of a constructive trust or otherwise.42
Courts have similarly denied nonoperators protection when an opera-
tor releases a lease and subsequently obtains a new lease on the same
property.43
In apparent recognition of a potential for abuse by operators of
their right to "shake off" nonoperating interests while preserving their
own, some courts have intimated that protection may be forthcoming
in situations involving fraud or collusion." One early case suggested
that "[ilf fraud or inequity were present, the courts would stand ready
to provide redress for the injured party. '45 That suggestion was later
translated into a duty of good faith.' "Quite apart from any stipula-
tions in the lease, the law implies a duty on the part of the assignee to
exercise good faith with respect to the assignor's retained interest in the
lease."'47 Although courts agree that a nonoperator might be protected
if fraud or collusion could be shown, courts have not allowed a show-
ing of fraud by parol evidence.48 The Statute of Frauds bars such proof
because it would vary the terms of the written instrument creating the
nonoperating interest. Although a question exists as to what type of
activity constitutes fraud, some cases suggest that fraud may be present
if production has been obtained when a top lease is taken.49
Courts may also protect nonoperators where there is collusion be-
42. Brannan v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 260 F.2d 621, 622 (10th Cir. 1958).
43. E.g., Keese v. Continental Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1956).
44. E.g., La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. 2d 131, 114 P.2d 351, 356 (1941); Campbell
v. Nako, Corp., 195 Kan. 66, 402 P.2d 771 (1965); Thomas v. Whyte, 5 Mich. App. 281, 146
N.W.2d 721 (1966); see S. GLASSMIRE, OIL AND GAs LEASES AND ROYALTIES 240 (2d ed. 1938)
(court of equity may enjoin surrender of lease obtained by fraud or collusion to cut out the nonop-
erating interest and substitute new lease); Discussion Notes, 6 OIL & GAS REP. 1339 (1957)
('IThere is still the possibility of constructing a trust in the event of fraud or other circumstances
which touch the conscience of equity.").
45. La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal. 2d 131,-, 114 P.2d 351, 356 (1941). The court,
however, found no fraud or inequity.
46. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McCormick, 211 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1954). The court did not,
however, find a lack of good faith.
47. Id at 364.
48. Wier v. Glassell, 216 La. 828, -, 44 So. 2d 882, 889 (1950).
49. Id.; see also Root Ref. Co. v. Olvey, 46 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1931) (duty of good faith
breached if nonoperator can prove that oil and gas were known to be present in commercially
producible quantities and were not produced by operator). In accordance with that view, the
court in Cain v. Neumann did protect a nonoperator against a surrender of a producing lease by
the operator. Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). In addition, under the
facts of Cain, delivery of the release was conditioned on the delivery of a new lease. This type of
[Vol. 18:496
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tween the lessor and the lessee-operator. In Campbell v. Nako Corp. ,50
a nonoperator alleged that such collusion was used to eliminate his
override. The court indicated that "there seems clearly emerging a duty
offair dealing required on the part of the lessee to which doctrine this
court has definitely inclined.""1 The court went on to state the rationale
for the duty as follows:
Thus it would seem that the particular circumstances under
which a lease is terminated and the presence or absence of
bad faith does play a part in determining the duration of the
overriding royalty. This would appear right and just as other-
wise the holder is completely at the mercy of any collusive
overreaching on the part of the owners of the other interests
and, though having bargained in good faith for an interest in
oil produced during the term of the lease, the law would be
powerless to protect him from an unjust cancellation of that
lease.5 2
The difficulty with the duty of fair dealing is recognizing what
constitutes fraud or other wrongdoing.53 Since, in the absence of spe-
cific provisions in the transfer agreement, the operator is free to take a
top lease or surrender the old lease and take a new lease, a question is
raised as to how that action is fraudulent or inequitable by reason of
the lessee's desire to be rid of a nonoperating interest.54 Another prob-
lem is that with the increasing use of extension and renewal clauses,
parties dealing at arm's length may be expected to include such provi-
sions if that is their intent. In the absence of such provisions, it may be
difficult to persuade a court to find a duty of fair dealing." Clearly, no
fiduciary relationship arises automatically between an operator and
nonoperator, but there appears to be developing a somewhat vaguely
defined duty of fair dealing,56 "the scope of which remains
undefined. 5 7
In accordance with their reluctance to protect nonoperators from
release appeared to be a sham. To protect the nonoperator, the court held that the surrender was
ineffective and that the base lease was still in effect. Id at 920.
50. 195 Kan. 66, 402 P.2d 771 (1965).
51. Id at -, 402 P.2d at 777 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
52. Id
53. McClintock, supra note 21, at 163.
54. Id at 163-64; see also Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 923 (rex. Civ. App. 1958)
(Murray, J., dissenting) (existence of override does not prevent operator from exercising right to
surrender lease and acquire new one).
55. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 358.
56. Id at 359.
57. Id at 362.
1983]
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wash-out transactions, courts will refuse to protect nonoperators when
the operator acquires an interest in the premises adverse to or not cov-
ered by the base lease.5" Generally, courts will not protect nonoper-
ators when the operator obtains a protection lease from the lessor who
asserts that the base lease has expired prior to the assignment.59
In certain special situations, however, courts provide increased
protection for nonoperators in the absence of protective clauses in the
transfer agreement. These situations include joint ventures,60 federal
58. See Whitten v. Daws, 226 Miss. 96, 83 So. 2d 744 (1955) (override did not attach to
interest acquired by assignee after it developed that part of mineral interest held by other persons
and not subject to lease); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 361. But cf.
Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 III. 2d 487, 147 N.E.2d 69 (1957). After discovering a defect in the title to
the leasehold, the operator acquired a new interest in the premises, to which the nonoperator's
override attached. The holding was based, however, on the finding of a fiduciary relationship
between the parties based on a joint venture.
59. See Lambe v. Glasscock, 360 S.W.2d 169 (rex. Civ. App. 1962). In this case, the opera-
tor had an option to surrender on notice, and an option to reassign if he could not verify if delay
rentals had been paid. The operator, after discovering that delay rentals had not been paid and
that the senior lease had terminated, obtained a new junior lease through a third party. One
commentator stated,
The practical effect of the holding in the subject case is that an assignee whose title
is doubtful, or which is questioned or disputed, may take steps to perfect his leasehold
estate by taking a new lease from the lessor without being irrevocably committed or
obligated to perform contractual obligations or payment of overriding royalty to an as-
signor of the lease subsequently determined to have expired prior to its assignment.
Discussion Notes, 17 OIL & GAS REP. 358 (1963); see also Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416
S.W.2d 798, 804-05 (Tex. 1967) (override did not attach to lease taken by operator when question
arose as to validity of base lease); c. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Evans, 232 Ark. 495, -, 338
S.W.2d 666, 669-70 (1960) (Lessor holding a void tax title was not protected when operators ac-
quired a lease from the true owners and refused to pay royalties to the lessor. The court said the
operators were not estopped to deny their lessor's title.); Knight v. Hemdon Drilling Co., 296 P.2d
158, 165 (Okla. 1955) (An assignee was not obligated to account to lessee-assignor for override on
production under protection lease. The court held that the first lease was canceled in an action by
the lessor against the lessee-assignor.). It must be remembered, however, that if the nonoperating
interest is carved out by the operator from his leasehold interest, the operator may be required to
share the new interest with the nonoperator. Nonoperating interests, such as nonparticipating
royalty interests, may be created by the mineral owner or lessor. Many other nonoperating inter-
ests are created out of an oil and gas lease by the lessee through grant or reservation. E. KuNTZ,
supra note 1, § 63.1, at 197. This result would be due to the doctrine of after-acquired title or
estoppel by deed. H. WILLLAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 420.2, at 362. But see Lambe v.
Glasscock, 360 S.W.2d 169, 172-73 (rex. Civ. App. 1962) (estoppel to assert invalidity of senior
lease was not applicable because operator did not claim under that lease); Sunac Petroleum Corp.
v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex. 1967) (although operator paid override out of base lease after
termination, estoppel not applicable). The court in Sunac did not believe the making of the over-
ride payments "constituted a material misrepresentation on [the operator's] part, or that [the non-
operator], in reliance on these payments, acted to his prejudice or changed his position." 1d
60. Where a fiduciary relationship exists due to a joint venture, courts will protect the
nonoperator, even absent provisions in the transfer agreement. See Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 Ill. 2d
487, 147 N.E.2d 69 (1957) (constructive trust imposed because joint venturer violated duty to act
for benefit ofjoint venture). A fiduciary relationship exists where parties work together to obtain
rights or where there is some sort of joint undertaking. Id at -, 147 N.E.2d at 74. "When the
relationship between the parties is that of concurrent owners, partners, or participants in a joint
venture, the courts appear ready to find a fiduciary relationship between the parties." H. WIL-
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oil and gas leases,6 and mergers.62
LIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 442.1, at 560.10. Where a fiduciary relationship is created
by a joint venture, federal oil and gas lease, or merger, a constructive trust acts to preserve the
nonoperating interest on a lease acquired by the operator in violation of his fiduciary obligations.
E. KuNTz, supra note 1, § 63.2, at 208. However, the interest must be within the scope of the
fiduciary duty. If not, the operator will not be required to share the benefits of his enterprise. H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 13, § 442.1, at 256. The burden is on the nonoperator seeking
to impose a constructive trust to show that a confidential relationship exists. E. KuN'rz, supra note
1, § 63.2, at 208-09. A fiduciary relationship may be shown by establishing the existence of a
mining partnership. See, e.g., Hatten v. Interocean Oil Co., 182 Okla. 465, 469, 78 P.2d 392, 397
(1938); Smith v. Bolin, 294 S.W.2d 280, 284-85 (rex. Civ. App. 1956) (fiduciary relationship be-
tween mining partners prevented operator from permitting partnership's leases to lapse, terminat-
ing nonoperating interests, and then obtaining renewal leases for himself). See generally McKay,
Joint Ventures and Mining Partnersh#ps, 7 U. KAN. L. REv. 22 (1958) (discussion of formation and
consequences of mining partnerships). McKay writes:
The relationship between a managing partner and his associates is fiducial, and there is a
consequent duty of acting in good faith and with honesty and diligence. The duty of an
operating partner to account to a non-operating partner applies to a mining partnership
the same as to a general partnership.
Id at 25 (footnotes omitted). A fiduciary relationship may be established by an agreement that
both parties will attempt to secure an oil and gas lease. See Howell v. Cooperative Refinery
Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, -, 271 P.2d 271, 274-75 (1954); cf. MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616, -,
180 S.W.2d 334, 337 (1944) (If a nonoperator can establish that the joint owner of an override
agreed to negotiate a renewal to protect both overriding interests, there is evidence of a fiduciary
relationship.). In addition, courts may find a fiduciary relationship when the parties jointly par-
ticipate in a plan of unitization, or enter into an operating agreement at the time the nonoperating
interest is created. See Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 Ill. 2d 487,-, 147 N.E.2d 69, 74 (1958) (rights and
duties governed by unitization agreement); Jack v. Hunt, 75 N.M. 686, -, 410 P.2d 403, 409
(1966) (operating agreement created fiduciary relationship).
61. A special situation arises in cases involving federal oil and gas leases. The exchange lease
and preference right lease are created by Congress. The laws change, extensions are granted, and
different forms of leases are issued to the operator while the first lease remains in effect. McClin-
tock, supra note 21, at 150; see also id at 150 n.20 (traces changes in federal leasing law). It has
been suggested that courts will "go a long way" to enforce operating interests carved out of per-
mits and leases issued between 1920 and 1935, despite meager provisions in the instruments as to
extensions, renewals, and substitutions. Id at 156. Prospecting permits and discovery leases were
substituted for the location method in 1920 pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of Feb. 25, 1920,
41 Stat. 437. Exchange leases were provided for in the Act of Aug. 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 674. McClin-
tock, supra note 21, at 150 n.20. McClintock suggests that one reason for expanded protection
might be that on private land the fee owner may grant as many leases as he wishes. Under a
federal lease, the land covered is removed from further leasing during the term of the lease. The
nonoperator is completely at the mercy of the lessee who can surrender the lease and refile. As
long as the lease is in effect, no other application for a lease can be filed. Id at 156. In Mimi
Corp. v. Hill, 310 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1962), the court preserved a nonoperating interest in a lease
on public land despite the absence of provisions for renewal or for the nonoperating interest to
carry forward to a preference lease. The court pointed out that a new preference lease had been
acquired through a statutory preference right in the base lease. Id at 469. The new lease was,
therefore, merely a continuation or "direct outgrowth" of the prior lease, so the nonoperating
interest attached. Id at 470. One commentator suggests that "It]he decision reflects a result that
would not be anticipated if the royalties had been carved out of a lease of privately owned land."
Discussion Notes, 17 OIL & GAS REP. 653, 653 (1963). It appears that McClintock would agree
with the result in Mimi. In discussing extensions of exchange leases and preference right leases, he
says, "In these circumstances, it appears that there would be every presumption that the extensions
are merely continuations of the original grant even though only the government assignment form
is used and nothing is said therein about extensions." McClintock, supra note 21, at 156; see Kutz
Canon Oil & Gas Co. v. Harr, 56 N.M. 358, 244 P.2d 522 (1952); f Oldland v. Gray, 179 F.2d
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IV. PROTECTIVE CLAUSES IN TRANSFER AGREEMENTS
To avoid uncertainty, nonoperators desiring to protect their inter-
ests may include an extension and renewal clause or a notice and offer
of reassignment provision in the transfer agreement. In addition to
directly protecting the nonoperator's interest, protective clauses may
serve as a basis for the imposition of a constructive trust. A construc-
tive trust can be imposed if a court determines that inclusion of the
protective clause creates a fiduciary relationship. 63 Courts consider the
surrounding circumstances and the parties' intent, as evidenced by in-
clusion of the protective clause, to determine whether a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists.
Courts determine the parties' intent in including extension and re-
newal provisions by looking to the language of the provisions." How-
ever, the intent of parties in including certain language is not always
408, 414-15 (10th Cir. 1950) (fiduciary relationship created by assignment of prospecting permit
not extinguished by 1935 amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 948
(1950); Jack v. Hunt, 75 N.M. 686, -, 410 P.2d 403, 411 (1966) (equity requires that override be
proportionately reduced but not extinguished by subsequent increase in royalty rate of govern-
ment, as lessor, due to fiduciary relation created by operating agreement).
62. Where contractual language in a transfer agreement indicates an intent that an override
remain in effect upon a merger of interests, a court will preserve the overriding royalty. See Page
v. Fees-Krey, Inc., 617 P.2d 1188 (Colo. 1980). In this case, the interests of a sublessor and subles-
see merged by transfer to one person. The court preserved the overriding royalty reserved out of
the sublease, stating,
Application of the doctrine of merger to defeat an overriding royalty interest contrary to
the intent of the holders of the interests of the sublessor and sublessee as expressed in the
document by which both such interests came together in one owner would be inequita-
ble; neither policy nor precedent requires such a result.
Id at 1195. In another case, even the terms of an agreement could not be extinguished by merger
of interests. A lease was assigned pursuant to a farmout agreement containing an extension and
renewal clause. The lease did not contain the clause. When the operator obtained a renewal
lease, he argued that the farmout terms were merged and superseded so that he would not have to
pay the overriding royalty. The court said the farmout agreement and the assignment together
constituted the contract. Construed together, the nonoperating interest attached to the renewal
lease. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stack, 246 So.2d 546, 547-48 (Miss. 1971). Furthermore, even
without contractual provisions, at least one court has indicated that an oil payment holder might
have protection against a merger of the operating interest with the lessor's estate, saying, "Equity
would not countenance a merger of interests by [the operator] to the prejudice of [the nonoper-
ator]." Matthews v. Ramsey-Lloyd Oil Co., 121 Kan. 75, -, 245 P. 1064, 1067 (1926).
63. See Probst v. Hughes, 143 Okla. 11, 286 P. 875 (1930).
64. Bown v. Austral Oil Co., 322 So. 2d 866, 870 (La. Ct. App. 1975). In Bown, an agreement
to assign nonoperating interests stated that the nonoperating interest was to be assigned from two
specific leases in a prospect. Id at 871. The court easily concluded that by including such lan-
guage, the parties did not intend for nonoperating interests to be assigned out of all the leases
acquired in the prospect. Id at 872. Furthermore, the court found that upon the expiration of
two specific leases, the nonoperating interest terminated and the operator was free to acquire any
new leases or renewals of the old leases from the landowners. Id The agreement did not demon-
strate that the parties intended the nonoperating interest to attach to renewals or subsequent
leases. Id at 870-72.
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clear. As a result, the same provision may have a different effect on the
relationship between the parties depending on the court's construction
of the provision.6" Courts also look at the surrounding circumstances
of a particular case to determine whether a fiduciary relationship is in-
tended.6 Factors which indicate that a fiduciary relationship exists
include the presence of a drilling covenant and the fact that a major
part of the consideration for the transfer was to be paid out of the oil
produced.67 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Rees v. Briscoe6" found
a fiduciary relationship based on the factors of an assignment made for
no consideration, the nonoperator's lack of action based on his convic-
tion that his interest would be protected despite his knowledge that the
operator was obtaining new leases, and prior dealings between the par-
ties. 69 The fact that the nonoperator easily could have protected him-
self by express language in the transfer agreement and elected not to do
so only served to further convince the court that the nonoperator had
65. This result may be illustrated by cases construing a provision that the reserved nonoper-
ating interest is a "covenant running with the land." Although recognizing that an overriding
royalty is not a covenant running with the land, one court found that by including such a provi-
sion, the nonoperator "sought" to establish a fiduciary relationship. Kennedy v. Seaboard Oil
Co., 99 F. Supp. 730, 733 (N.D. Cal. 1951). This case exemplifies "a court straining to protect [a
nonoperator] who foresaw the washout problem but tried to protect himself in an inept manner."
Warren, supra note 22, at 418 n.105. In a factually similar case with the same protective language,
the court did not find a fiduciary relationship. Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Kennedy, 251 F.2d 424, 432
(9th Cir. 1957). The court stated that the inclusion of the clause was for the limited purpose of
assuring the nonoperator that his interest would not be cut off by the actions of the nonoperator.
To bolster its determination that no fiduciary relationship was intended, the court said, "If they
had desired to establish an express trust, there would have been no difficulty for an expert drafts-
man to have chosen apt language to create such a relationship." Id The different results in the
eases are due to the differing views of the courts as to the parties' intent in including such a
provision. It appears that language in a transfer agreement that the nonoperating interest is a
"covenant running with the land" will not create a fiduciary relationship. In one case, a court said
that contractual obligations depend on the intent of the parties and that parties do not intend
"covenant running with the land" to mean that an override would apply to unrelated new leases
subsequently acquired. K & E Drilling, Inc. v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29,-, 340 P.2d 919,923 (1959).
The court supported its conclusion by saying that if the parties intended the override to apply to
new leases, they might have said so in appropriate language. Id
66. See MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334 (1944). McClintock writes in
agreement: "[i1t is apparent that the question of whether the old interest should be charged
against the new lease depends upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case and, in
the event of litigation, evidence will be received as to the negotiations and representations of the
parties." McClintock, supra note 21, at 155.
67. Hivick .v. Urschel, 171 Okla. 17, 20, 40 P.2d 1077, 1080 (1935). The court states that a
fiduciary relationship may exist under many circumstances. "[lit exists in all cases where there
has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and conscience is bound to act in good
faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence." Id at 20, 40 P.2d at
1080. But see Goocey v. Hopkins, 206 Ky. 176, -, 266 S.W. 1087, 1088 (1925) (no fiduciary
relationship regardless of existence of drilling covenant).
68. 315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957).
69. Id at 761-63 (court imposed a constructive trust on new leases acquired by operator).
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full confidence in and relied upon the operator. The court said, "Had
the [nonoperator] doubted [the operator] he would no doubt have seen
that such provisions were included in his assignments. 70
The decision inRees v. Briscoe evoked a dissent by three justices, 7t
and created uncertainty regarding appropriate application of the rule
that no fiduciary relationship exists between an operator and a non-
operator. Rees has been interpreted as requiring an examination of
"the underlying facts" to determine whether a fiduciary relationship
exists between the parties which requires the operator to protect a non-
operating interest when taking a new lease.72 However, it has been sug-
gested that "the conscience of the court was touched by the overall
circumstances of the case making the court feel it necessary, to prevent
injustice, to give the judgment [for the holder of the nonoperating
interest]."73
Extension and renewal clauses are being used increasingly in in-
struments creating nonoperating interests. For an extension and re-
newal clause to be effective, it must appear in the instrument creating
the nonoperating interest.74 When these clauses do appear, a court
must consider whether a new lease is actually an extension or renewal
of the old lease. Furthermore, the existence of the clause may have the
indirect effect of demonstrating that the parties intended a fiduciary
relationship to exist. One commentator wrote,
70. Id at 763.
71. Id at 764 (Williams, Davison & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
72. Note, supra note 67, at 87-88 (1958).
73. Note, Oil and Gas: Relationshop Between Assignor and Assignee of Lease, 11 OKLA. L.
REV. 92, 94 (1958). This commentator believes Rees is a special case and that the decision must be
limited to its facts. Id at 94-95. In a case decided the following year, the court found that there
was no fiduciary relationship between the parties and distinguished the facts in Rees. Brannan v.
Sohio Petroleum Co., 260 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1958). The court pointed out that in Brannan,
substantial consideration had been paid for the assignment, there was no covenant to drill, and
there were no prior dealings between the parties. Id at 622-23.
74. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Honolulu Oil Corp., 241 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1957). In
Texas PacfMc, a nonoperating interest holder could not claim an interest in a new lease. An
attempted addition of a clause into an instrument executed after termination of the lease, that the
nonoperating interest would attach to any new leases made between the assignee and landowners,
was ineffective. Id at 923. Courts cannot hold parties to provisions that are not present in the
original agreement because the parties might have intended not to include them. See Bardill, Inc.
v. Bird, 346 S.W.2d 25, 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (no duty to keep lease alive where not provided for
by express terms of contract); Vf. Fain & McGaha v. Biesel, 331 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) (language in release ineffective to alter nature of nonoperating rights under instrument cre-
ating nonoperating interest). One commentator believes that the Texas Pacpfc decision turns on
"equity under the particular set of facts rather than on any well-defined rules for construction of
instruments." He says the court thought that the nonoperator had "beefed up" the assignment
agreement beyond the contemplation of the parties. Cage, Anatomy ofa Farmout, 21 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 153, 173 (1970).
[Vol. 18:496
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When there is a covenant which provides that the rights
of the interest owner shall apply to any extension or renewal
of the lease, the courts will generally give effect to what it
deems to be the intention of the parties in the agreement and
it will not give a narrow interpretation to the terms used.75
Early cases found a fiduciary relationship existed when the lease
assignment contained an extension and renewal provision.76 Upon ex-
piration or renewal of the base lease, this provision would allow the
court to attach the nonoperating interest to any new leases acquired by
the operator prior to the expiration of the old lease. In Howell v. Coop-
erative Refnery Association,77 the court held that due to a confidential
relationship between the parties a nonoperating interest attached to a
new lease acquired more than a year after the expiration date of the old
lease. This result might be explained not only by the court's interpreta-
tion of the language, but also by the particular facts involved.7"
A clause interpretation rule emerged that where the assignment of
a lease expressly provides that the reservation of a nonoperating inter-
est should apply to extensions, renewals, or modifications of any lease
acquired by the assignee or his successors, such provision indicates a
relationship of trust and confidence between the assignor and his as-
signees entitling the assignor to payment of the nonoperating interest
reserved out of oil or gas produced under a subsequent lease.79 How-
ever, this policy of broad protection for nonoperators was limited by
later cases.8 0
Relying on an "intent" analysis, these courts found that extension
and renewal clauses did not create a fiduciary relationship between an
operator and a nonoperator. In K & E Drilling, Inc. v. Warren,"' there
was an extension and renewal clause, the assignment was made in con-
sideration of the operator drilling a test well, and there was a provision
75. McClintock, supra note 21, at 154.
76. E.g., Oldland v. Gray, 179 F.2d 408, 414 (10th Cir. 1950) (case involved assignment of oil
and gas prospecting permit on public lands with assignee promising to drill and develop); Probst
v. Hughes, 143 Okla. 11, 286 P. 875 (1930).
77. 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954).
78. Id at -, 271 P.2d at 275. A geologist assigned leases to an oil company reserving an
override. Prior to the expiration of the leases, the geologist called to the operator's attention the
fact that the leases needed to be renewed. The geologist worked closely with the operator to
obtain the renewals after the leases expired. Id Under these facts, the equities were with the
nonoperator.
79. W. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 554, at 637-39.
80. Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 875, 885 (10th Cir. 1962); K & E Drilling, Inc.
v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29, 340 P.2d 919 (1959).
81. 185 Kan. 29, 340 P.2d 919 (1959).
1983]
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that the reservation was deemed to be a covenant running with the
land. 2 Although earlier courts might have easily found an intent to
create a fiduciary relationship based on these facts, this court held that
by including an extension and renewal clause the parties merely in-
tended the nonoperating interest to apply to production under specific
leases or extension or renewals thereof. The court reasoned that if the
parties had intended the nonoperating interest to apply to unrelated
new leases subsequently acquired in the same property, they would
have expressly said so in appropriate language.8 3
At present, substantial confusion exists concerning the direct effect
of extension and renewal clauses and the indirect effect of the clauses as
manifesting an intent to create a fiduciary relationship. Finding no
fiduciary relationship, the court in Meeker v. Ambassador,84 without
mentioning Howell, 5 distinguished Rees and other earlier cases on the
basis that in those cases, new leases were obtainedprior to the termina-
tion of the base lease.8 6 The court's distinction is a non sequitur.
Whether a new lease is acquired before or after the termination of the
base lease should have little bearing in determining whether a fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties, unless the lease is acquired so
much later that the fiduciary relationship can no longer be said to exist.
If the parties intended to create a fiduciary relationship by including an
extension and renewal clause, the circumstances under which a new
lease is acquired should have no bearing on the existence of the fiduci-
ary relationship. 7 Rather than considering the indirect effect, the court
82. Id at -, 340 P.2d at 920.
83. Id at-, 340 P.2d at 923. A clause that would apply to "new leases" has been held to be
in violation of the rule against perpetuities. See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 345
F. Supp. 28, 30 (W.D. Okla. 1972). This rule voids any property right that may vest more than 21
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. Independent Gas & Oil Producers v.
Union Oil Co., 669 F.2d 624, 628 (10th Cir. 1982). It has been held, however, that property
interests in extensions and renewals of the lease do not violate the rule against perpetuities be-
cause all rights under the lease and clause are vested at the time of the assignment of the nonoper-
ating interest. See id; Howell v. Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 176 Kan. 572, -,271 P.2d 271, 275-
76 (1954). One commentator writes, "This is a valid conclusion if it is assumed that the new lease
is in substance the old lease extended. If it is in substance a new lease, then the conclusion on the
application of the rule against perpetuities is questionable." E. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 63.2, at
207. In the latter situation, the extension and renewal clause would seem to amount to a contrac-
tual provision for the creation of a new lease in the future, and no rights can be vested in the new
lease until it is granted. Id
84. 308 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962).
85. 176 Kan. 572, 271 P.2d 271 (1954). In Howell, a new lease was acquired more than a year
after the termination of the base lease, and the court found a fiduciary relationship. Id
86. Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 875, 885-87 (10th Cir. 1962).
87. The circumstances under which a new lease is acquired may have bearing on the question
of whether the operator acted in good faith. See Campbell v. Nako Corp., 195 Kan. 66, -, 402
P.2d 771, 777 (1965) ("[TIhe particular circumstances under which a lease is terminated and the
[Vol. 18:496
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in Meeker focused on the direct effect of the language, holding that a
new lease could not "constitute an extension or renewal of a lease that
had theretofore terminated and no longer existed."88
In the more recent case of Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes,89 the
court held that no fiduciary relationship is created by the existence of
an extension or renewal clause.90 Although the court did not confuse
the direct and indirect effect of the extension and renewal clause, it
employed an unusual method to negate its indirect effect.
In Sunac, the court correctly pointed out that a fiduciary relation-
ship may be based on: "1) specific language in the assignment or 2) the
close relationship between the parties shown by the particular facts in-
volved."9 1 By focusing on the direct effect of the extension and renewal
clause, the court found that the new lease was not an "extension" or
"renewal" because the base lease "had long since expired" and the new
lease was on substantially different terms and for a new considera-
tion.92 The court then considered the facts and found no fiduciary rela-
tionship, saying, "There is no evidence that Sunac occupied a position
of confidence or trust with Parkes other than the clause relating to ex-
tensions or renewals." 93 The court seemed to distinguish Howell on the
basis of a fiduciary relationship existing independently of the extension
and renewal clause. Although recognizing that courts typically inter-
pret such clauses to create a fiduciary relationship, the court in Sunac
negated the effect of an extension and renewal clause on the basis of a
provision in the assignment which stated that the operator would have
no duty to keep the lease alive. By construing the provisions together,
the court found that the provision relieving the operator of the duty to
perpetuate the lease also relieved him of the duty to perpetuate the
nonoperating interest.94 This analysis was vigorously attacked by three
presence or absence of bad faith does [sic] play a part in determining the duration of the overrid-
ing royalty."); cf. K & E Drilling, Inc. v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29, -, 340 P.2d 919, 923 (1959)
(circumstances of acquisition of new lease did not manifest bad faith). Surrounding circumstances
may also be relevant as to whether the new lease is in fact an extension or renewal of the base
lease. See Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 803 (rex. 1967).
88. Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 875, 887 (10th Cir. 1962).
89. 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967).
90. Id at 804-05. The operators had been producing oil under a lease for a year when a
question arose as to whether the lease had terminated before drilling operations had begun. The
operators obtained a new lease while the well was still producing, then ceased to pay an overriding
royalty to the nonoperator. The court determined that the original lease had terminated and that
the override did not attach to the subsequently acquired lease. Id at 802-03.
91. Id at 803.
92. Id at 802.
93. Id at 804.
94. Id
19831
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dissenting justices95 who argued that the extension and renewal clause,
"irrespective of, and in the complete absence of, any confidential or
personal relation between such parties," 96 imposed a fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties.
Sunac is noteworthy in that the analysis employed by both the ma-
jority and the dissenting opinions sets up a framework for determining
the effect of an extension and renewal clause. The court first consid-
ered whether the clause directly applied to the new lease and then
whether the new lease was actually an extension or renewal of the old
lease. Whether the new lease was acquired before or after the termina-
tion of the contract and the terms of the new lease were important fac-
tors. The court then looked to the underlying facts to determine
whether a fiduciary relationship existed independent of the extension
and renewal clause. Finally, the court reached the question of whether
a fiduciary relationship may be imposed by virtue of the extension and
renewal clause. Differing opinions as to the intent of the parties under-
lie the differences between the majority and dissent on this question.
The majority believed that any intent to create a fiduciary relationship
based on an extension and renewal clause was overcome by a contrary
intent manifested by the inclusion of the provision relieving the opera-
tor of any duty to perpetuate the lease.97 The dissent, on the other
hand, believed that the inclusion of an extension and renewal clause
was de facto evidence of an intent to create a fiduciary relationship,
regardless of the other provision.98 In addition to its value as a frame-
work for analyzing the effect of clauses in an assignment, Sunac lends
support to the growing number of cases denying nonoperators protec-
tion after the lease has expired.99
However, a recent case has reopened the possibility for a nonoper-
95. Id at 806 (Smith, Hamilton & Pope, JJ., dissenting). Hamilton says, "The provision
relieves [the operator] of no duty imposed by the lease.... Consequently, it is difficult to under-
stand by what reasoning the Court can say that such provision destroys the relationship of trust
and confidence created by the 'renewal or extension' provision contained in the assignment." Id
at 811. The dissent also argued that a confidential relationship existed between the parties inde-
pendently of the "extension and renewal" clause, due to circumstances existing when the new
lease was taken. The nonoperator's rights were equally involved when the lease's validity was
questioned, and in a suit on the matter, the nonoperator would have been an indispensible party.
Id
96. Id at 809.
97. Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967).
98. Id at 807-08.
99. E.g., Gasperson v. Christie, Mitchell & Mitchell Co., 418 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967); cf. McCormick v. Krueger, 593 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (third party who obtained
salvage rights under lease with extension and renewal clause not bound by lease terms when he
obtained new lease; therefore, overriding royalty did not apply to new lease).
[Vol. 18:496
17
Schoole: Fiduciary Protection of Nonoperating Oil and Gas Interests agains
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982
NONOPER TING OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
ator to protect his interest even after the lease has expired, at least in
Oklahoma."co In Independent Gas and Oil Producers, Inc. v. Union
Oil,°' the court held that the new lease was "converted" into a renewal
of the old one by the extension and renewal provision of the contract
and that the existence of the clause "triggered" the operation of the
fiduciary rule. The court went on to state, "This rule has been applied
even where the new lease did not issue until the old one had expired for
lack of production."102 Like the dissent in Sunac, the court found that
the intent expressed by the inclusion of the clause itself provided a ba-
sis for imposing a fiduciary relationship. "Where an assignment pro-
vides that subsequent lease extensions and renewals are subject to an
overriding royalty, the assignee stands as a quasi-trustee vis-a-vis the
assignor and must exercise the utmost good faith in protecting the lat-
ter's interest in the leasehold."10 3
The court did not, however, rely solely on the existence of the
clause. Having found that the fiduciary rule had been triggered, the
court then looked for additional support for the propriety of the rule's
application in light of other "underlying facts." °4 Important factors
were that the royalty was an important part of the consideration for the
assignment, 10 5 the operator believed the lease to be lucrative despite
temporary cessation,106 and the operator exhibited bad faith in at-
tempting to cheat Union out of the royalty.10 7 The court considered it
immaterial that Union paid nothing additional for the new lease, that
Independent was not responsible for the termination of the original
lease, that Independent obtained the second lease through a third party,
and that Union waited several months after terminating the second
lease before bringing its claim.10 8 The court concluded that the second
lease was a renewal to which Union's overriding royalty attached.
100. Independent Gas & Oil Producers, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 669 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1982).
101. Id. In this case, Union conveyed an oil and gas lease to Independent, reserving an over-
riding royalty. There was an extension and renewal clause in the transfer agreement, and the
consideration for the assignment was the royalty and a drilling covenant. A test well problem
developed and, to protect its interest, Independent obtained a second lease through a third party.
Independent refused to recognize Union's override, theorizing that the second lease was not an
extension or renewal of the first lease. Id
102. Id at 627.
103. Id
104. Id. The court leaves open the circumstances under which application of the fiduciary rule
would be inappropriate. Id
105. Id; see Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758, 763 (Okla. 1957).
106. 669 F.2d at 627; see Probst v. Hughes, 143 Okla. 11, 13, 286 P. 875, 877 (1930).
107. 669 F.2d at 627.
108. Independent Gas & Oil Producers v. Union Oil, 669 F.2d 624, 627-28 (10th Cir. 1982).
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As in Sunac, the court went through a proper analysis in determin-
ing whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. The
primary focus of the court should be on the intentions and objectives of
the parties, as expressed in the language of the assignment and the sur-
rounding circumstances. 9 The existence of an extension and renewal
clause in an assignment should be a signal to the court that the parties
may have intended to create a fiduciary relationship. The court must
then examine other language in the assignment and the surrounding
circumstances to determine whether the creation of a fiduciary relation-
ship was in fact intended by the parties or was necessary to achieve
their objectives. Important factors include the consideration for the as-
signment, the presence or absence of drilling covenants, prior dealings
or trust between the parties, and the equities of the case.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the interests of nonoperators receive little or no protection
apart from the terms of the transfer agreement, the prudent nonoper-
ator will include protective clauses in the transfer agreement. When
experienced nonoperators do not include such provisions, courts should
feel no compulsion to protect the nonoperator. However, recognizing
that the inclusion of an extension and renewal clause is generally some
evidence of an intent to create a fiduciary relationship, courts should
give these protective clauses a broad reading. When courts fail to per-
ceive this "indirect" effect of the protective clauses and construe them
narrowly, nonoperators are vulnerable to defeasement by acts of the
operator. Despite the current judicial uncertainty as to the precise
rights and obligations between operators and nonoperators, careful
drafting and inclusion of protective language in creating instruments
and the corresponding judicial implication of a fiduciary relationship
will afford prudent nonoperators appropriate protection of their
interests.
Sharon K. Schooley
109. See Id at 627; McClintock, supra note 21, at 154. McClintock says, "The question of
whether a fiduciary relationship exists does not seem too important and the real purpose of the
court is to determine the intention of the parties." Id
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